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Abstract
We consider the problem of multi-product dynamic pricing, in a contextual setting, for
a seller of differentiated products. In this environment, the customers arrive over time and
products are described by high-dimensional feature vectors. Each customer chooses a product
according to the widely used Multinomial Logit (MNL) choice model and her utility depends
on the product features as well as the prices offered. Our model allows for heterogenous price
sensitivities for products. The seller a-priori does not know the parameters of the choice model
but can learn them through interactions with the customers. The seller’s goal is to design
a pricing policy that maximizes her cumulative revenue. This model is motivated by online
marketplaces such as Airbnb platform and online advertising. We measure the performance of a
pricing policy in terms of regret, which is the expected revenue loss with respect to a clairvoyant
policy that knows the parameters of the choice model in advance and always sets the revenue-
maximizing prices. We propose a pricing policy, named M3P, that achieves a T -period regret
of O(log(Td)(
√
T + d log(T ))) under heterogenous price sensitivity for products with features of
dimension d. We also prove that no policy can achieve worst-case T -regret better than Ω(
√
T ).
1 Introduction
Online marketplaces offer very large number of products described by a large number of features.
This contextual information creates differentiation among products and also affects the willingness-
to-pay of buyers. To provide more context, let us consider the Airbnb platform: the products sold
in this market are “stays.” In booking a stay, the user first selects the destination city, dates of visit,
type of place (entire place, 1 bedroom, shared room, etc) and hence narrows down her choice to a
so-called consideration set. The platform then sets the prices for the products in the consideration
set. Notably, the products here are highly differentiable. Each product can be described by a high-
dimensional feature vector that encodes its properties, such as space, amenities, walking score, house
rules, reviews of previous tenants, etc. We study a model where the platform aims to maximize its
cumulative revenue.
In setting prices, there is a clear tradeoff: A high price may drive the user away (decreases the
likelihood of a sale) and hence hurts the revenue. A low price, on the other hand encourages the
user to purchase the product; however, it results in a smaller revenue from that sell. Therefore, in
order for the seller to maximize its revenue, it must try to learn the purchase behavior of the users.
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Through interactions with users and observing their purchasing decisions, the seller can learn how
users weigh different features in their purchasing decisions.
In this work, we study a setting where the utility from buying a product is a function of the
product features and its price. Let u(θ0, γ0, x˜, p) be the utility obtained from buying a product
with feature vector x˜, at price p where the parameter vectors θ0 and γ0, in R
d, represent the users’
purchase behavior. Namely, θ0 captures the contribution of each feature to the user’s valuations of
the products and γ0 captures the sensitivity of the utility to the price. We focus on utility model:
u(θ0, x˜, p) = ψ
(
〈φ(x˜), θ0〉 − 〈φ(x˜), γ0〉p + z
)
, (1)
where φ : Rd˜ 7→ Rd is a feature mapping and ψ : R 7→ R is a general strictly increasing function
and 〈a, b〉 indicates the inner product of two vectors a and b. The mapping φ and function ψ
are fixed and known. The term z, a.k.a. market noise, captures the idiosyncratic change in the
valuation of each user. Throughout, we use the notation x ≡ φ(x˜) for the mapped features and
define βx = 〈x, γ0〉 the price sensitivity parameter of a product with (mapped) feature x. Examples
of such utility models include: (i) Log-log model (ψ(y) = ey, φ(y) = ln(y)); (ii) Semi-log model
(ψ(y) = ey, φ(y) = y); and (iii) Logistic model (ψ(y) = ey/(1 + ey), φ(y) = y). We encode the
“no-purchase” option as a new product with zero utility. We emphasize that the parameters of the
utility model, θ0 and γ0, are a priori unknown to the seller.
In our model, given a consideration set, the customer chooses the products that results in
the highest utility. We study the widely used Multinomial Logit (MNL) choice model [27] which
corresponds to having the noise terms, Eq (1), drawn independently from a standard Gumbel
distribution, whose cdf is given by G(y) = e−e
−y
[30]. The MNL model is arguably the most
popular random utility model with a long history in economics and marketing research to model
choice behavior [27, 26, 20].
We propose a dynamic pricing policy, called M3P, for Multi-Product Pricing Policy in high-
dimensional environments. Our policy uses maximum likelihood method to estimate the true
parameters of the utility model based on previous purchasing behavior of the users.
We measure the performance of a pricing policy in terms of the regret, which is the difference
between the expected revenue obtained by the pricing policy and the revenue gained by a clairvoyant
policy that has full information of the parameters of the utility model and always offers the revenue-
maximizing price. Our policy, achieves a T -regret of O(log(Td)(
√
T + d log(T ))), where d and T
respectively denote the features dimension and the length of the time horizon. Furthermore, we
also prove that our policy is almost optimal in the sense that no policy can achieve worst-case
T -regret better than Ω(
√
T ).
In the next section, we briefly review the related work to ours. We would like to highlight
that our work is distinguished from the previous literature in two major aspects: (i) Multi-product
pricing that should take into account the interaction of different products as changing the price
for one product may shift the demand for other products, and this dependence makes the pricing
problem even more complex. (ii) Heterogeneity and uncertainty in price sensitivity parameters.
Related Work
There is a vast literature on dynamic pricing as one of the central problems in revenue management.
We refer the reader to [12, 3] for extensive surveys on this area. A popular theme in this area is
dynamic pricing with learning where there is uncertainty about the demand function, but informa-
tion about it can be obtained via interaction with customers. A line of work [2, 16, 21, 7, 17, 9]
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took Bayesian approach for the learning part and studied this problem in non-contextual setting.
Another related line of work assumes parametric models for the demand function with a small
number of parameters, and proposes policies to learn these parameters using statistical procedures
such as maximum likelihood [5, 6, 14, 13, 8] or least square estimation [5, 18, 24].
Recently, there has been an interest in dynamic pricing in contextual setting. The work [1,
10, 25, 23, 4] consider single-product setting where the seller receives a single product at each
step to sell (corresponding to N = 1 in our setting) and assume equal price sensitivities β = 1
for all products. In [1], the authors consider a noiseless valuation model with strategic buyer and
propose a policy with T -period regret of order O(T 2/3). This setting has been extended to include
market noise and also a market of strategic buyers who are utility maximizers [19]. In [10], authors
propose a pricing policy based on binary search in high-dimension with adversarial features that
achieves regret O(d2 log(T/d)). The work [23] studies the dynamic pricing in high-dimensional
contextual setting with sparsity structure and propose a policy with regret O(s0 log(d) log(T )) but
in a single-product scenario. The dynamic pricing problem has also been studied under time-varying
coefficient valuation models [22] to address the time-varying purchase behavior of customers and
the perishability of sales data. Very recently, [28] studied high-dimensional multi-product pricing,
with a low-dimensional linear model for the aggregate demand. In this model, the demand vector
for all the products at each step is observed, while in our work the seller only sees the product
index that is chosen by the buyer at each step. Similarly, [29] studies a model where the seller can
observe the aggregate demand and proposes a myopic policy based on least-square estimations that
obtains a logarithmic regret.
2 Model
We consider a firm which sells a set of products to customers that arrive over time. The products
are differentiated and each is described by a wide range of features. At each step t, the customer
selects a consideration set Ct of size at most N from the available products. This is the set the
customer will actively consider in her purchase decision. The seller sets the price for each of the
products in this set, after which the customer may choose (at most) one of the products in Ct. If
he chooses a product, a sale occurs and the seller collects a revenue in the amount of the posted
price; otherwise, no sale occurs and seller does not get any revenue.
Each product i is represented by an observable vector of features x˜i ∈ Rd˜. Products offered at
different round can be highly differentiated (their features vary) and we assume that the feature
vectors are sampled independently from a fixed, but unknown, distribution D ⊂ Rd˜. We recall the
notation x ≡ φ(x˜) where φ : Rd˜ 7→ Rd is the feature mapping.
We assume that ‖xi‖∞ ≤ 1 for all x˜t in the support of D, and ‖(θ0, γ0)‖ ≤W , for an arbitrarily
large but fixed constant W . Throughout the paper, we use ‖ · ‖ to indicate the ℓ2 norm.
If an item i (at period t) is priced at pit, then the customer obtains utility uit from buying it,
where1
uit = ψ
(
〈φ(x˜i), θ0〉 − 〈φ(x˜i), γ0〉pit + zit
)
.
Here, θ0, γ0 ∈ Rd are the parameters of the demand curve and are unknown a priori to the seller.
The feature mapping φ and the function ψ are both fixed and known.
1In general the offered price not only depends on the feature vectors xi but also the period t, as the estimate of
the model parameters may vary across time t. We make this explicit in the notation pit by considering both i and t
in the subscript.
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This is a random utility model with zit component representing market shocks and are modeled
as zero mean random variables drawn independently and identically from a standard Gumbel
distribution. At each round, the customer chooses the product that results in the highest utility.
Since ψ is strictly increasing, this corresponds to the product with the highest ψ−1(uit). For noise
drawn from standard Gumbel distribution, this brings us to the multinomial logit (MNL) choice
model that has been widely used in academic literature and practice [30, 15]. Under the MNL
model, the probability of choosing an item i from set Ct is given by
qit ≡ P(it = i|Ct) = exp(u
0
it)
1 +
∑
ℓ∈Ct
exp(u0ℓt)
, for i ∈ Ct , (2)
where u0it = 〈xi, θ0〉 − 〈xi, γ0〉pit, for i ∈ Ct, where we recall that xi ≡ φ(x˜i).
We refer to the term βi = 〈xi, γ0〉 in the utility model as the price sensitivity of product i. Note
that our model allows for heterogeneous price sensitivities. We also encode the no-purchase option
by item ∅, with market utility z∅t, drawn from zero mean Gumbel distribution. The random utility
z∅t can be interpreted as the utility obtained from choosing an option outside the offered ones. This
is equivalent to u0∅t = 0. Having the utility model established as above, at all steps the user chooses
the item with maximum utility from her consideration set; in case of equal utilities, we break the
tie randomly.
To summarize, our setting is as follows. At each period t:
1. The user narrows down her options by forming a consideration set Ct of size at most N .
2. For each product i ∈ Ct, the seller offers a price pit.2
3. The user chooses item it ∈ Ct∪{∅} where it = argmaxi∈Ct∪{∅} uit.
4. The seller observes what product is chosen from the consideration set and uses this information
to set the future prices.
We make the following assumption that ensures positivity of the products price sensitivity
parameters. Per this assumption, note that for a product with feature x˜i ∈ D, the price sensitivity
is given by 〈φ(x˜i), γ0〉 = 〈xi, γ0〉.
Assumption 2.1. We have min{〈x, γ0〉 : φ−1(x) ∈ D} ≥ L0 > 0, for some constant L0.
Before proceeding with the policy description, we will discuss the benchmark policy which is
used in defining the notion of regret and measuring the performance of pricing policies.
3 Benchmark policy
The seller’s goal is to minimize her regret, which is defined as the expected revenue loss against
a clairvoyant policy that knows the utility model parameters θ0, γ0 in advance and always offers
the revenue-maximizing prices. We next characterize the benchmark policy. Let p∗t = (p
∗
it)i∈Ct ,
βt = (βi)i∈Ct , where βi = 〈xi, γ0〉 and Xt ∈ R|Ct|×d be the feature matrix, which is obtained by
2Equivalently, the seller can determine all the prices in advance and reveal them after the user determines the
consideration set. We note that the consideration set of the user does not depend on the prices, but the choice she
makes from the consideration set depends on the prices. In addition, recall that all the users share the same θ0 and
γ0 and the choice of consideration set does not reveal information about these parameters.
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stacking xi, i ∈ Ct as its rows (Recall that |Ct| ≤ N). The proposition below gives an implicit
formula to write the vector of optimal prices p∗t as a function p
∗
t = g(Xtγ0,Xtθ0). We refer to g as
the pricing function.
Proposition 3.1. The benchmark policy that knows the utility model parameters θ0, γ0, sets the
optimal prices as follows: For product i ∈ Ct, the optimal price is given by p∗it = 1〈xi,γ0〉 +B0t , where
B0t is the unique value of B satisfying the following equation:
B =
∑
ℓ∈Ct
1
〈xℓ, γ0〉e
−(1+〈xℓ,γ0〉B)e〈xℓ,θ0〉 . (3)
Proof of Proposition 3.1 is similar to that in [33, Theorem 3.1] and is deferred to Appendix A.
We can now formally define the notion of regret. Let π be a pricing policy that sets the vector
of prices pπt = (p
π
it)i∈Ct at time t for the products in the consideration set Ct. Then, the seller’s
expected revenue at period t, under such policy will be
revπt =
∑
i∈Ct
qitp
π
it , (4)
with qit being the probability of buying product i from the set Ct as given by Eq (2).3 Similarly,
we let rev∗t be the seller’s expected revenue under the benchmark policy that sets price vectors p
∗
t ,
at period t. The worst-case cumulative regret of policy π is defined as
Regretπ(T ) ≡ max
{ T∑
t=1
(rev∗t − revπt ) : ‖(θ0, γ0)‖ ≤W, φ(D) ⊆ [−1, 1]d
}
. (5)
4 Multi-Product Pricing Policy (M3P)
In this section, we provide a formal description of our multi-product dynamic pricing policy (M3P).
The policy sees the time horizon in an episodic structure, where the length of episodes grow linearly
. Specifically, episode k is of length ℓk = k + d, with the first d referred to as exploration periods
and the other k ones as exploitation periods. Throughout, we use notation Ek to refer to periods
in episode k, i.e., Ek = {ℓk, ..., ℓk+1−1}. In the exploration periods, the products prices are chosen
independently as pit ∼ Uniform([0, 1]).4 In the exploitation periods, we choose the optimal prices
based on the current estimate of the model parameters. Concretely, let Ik be the set of exploration
periods up to episode k, i.e., the set consisting of the initial d periods in episode 1, . . . , k, and hence
|Ik| = kd. We form the negative log-likelihood function for estimating ν0 = (θT0 , γT0 )T using the
sales data in periods Ik:
Lk(ν) = − 1
kd
∑
t∈Ik
log
exp(u0itt(ν))∑
ℓ∈Ct∪{∅}
exp(u0ℓt(ν))
,
where it denotes the product purchased at time t, and
u0it(ν) = 〈xi, θ〉 − 〈xi, γ〉pit , (9)
3More precisely, revπt is the expected revenue conditional on filtration Ft−1, where Ft is the sigma algebra generated
by feature matrices X1, . . . , Xt+1 and market shocks z1, . . . , zt.
4Indeed we can offer pit ∼ Uniform([0, C]) for any fixed constant C > 0 and C appears in the regret bound. But
since we treat C as a constant it does not affect the order of the regret.
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Input: (at time 0) function g, parameter W (bound on ‖ψ0‖1)
Input: (arrives over time) covariate matrices {Xt}t∈[T ]
Output: prices {pt}t∈[T ]
1: τ1 ← 1, p1 ← 0, θ1 ← 0 and set the length of k-th episode: ℓk ← k + d
2: for each episode k = 1, 3, ... do
3: Exploration Phase: for the initial d periods of episode k, choose the prices of items
independently as pit ∼ Uniform([0, 1]).
4: Exploitation Phase: At the end of the exploration phase, update the model parameter
estimate ν̂k using the ML estimator applied to the previous exploration periods:
ν̂k = arg min
‖ν‖≤W
Lk(ν) , (6)
with Lk(ν) given by (10).
5: Exploitation Phase: offer prices based on the current estimate ν̂k =
[
θ̂k
γ̂k
]
as
pit ← 1〈xit, γ̂k〉 +Bt , (7)
where Bt is the unique value of B satisfying the following equation:
B =
∑
ℓ∈Ct
1
〈xℓ, γ̂k〉e
−(1+〈xℓ,γ̂
k〉B)e〈xℓ,θ̂
k〉 . (8)
Algorithm 1: M3P policy for multi-product dynamic pricing
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with ν = (θT , γT )T . We adopt the convention that it = ∅ for the “no-purchase” case with u0∅t(·) = 0.
The log-likelihood loss can be written in a more compact form. We let yt = (yit)i∈Ct be the
response vector that indicates which product is purchased at time t:
yit =
{
1 product i is chosen ,
0 otherwise .
We also let u0t (ν) = (u
0
it(ν))i∈Ct∪{0}. Then, the log-likelihood loss can be written as
Lk(ν) = − 1
kd
∑
t∈Ik
log
yt · exp(u0t (ν))
1 +
∑
ℓ∈Ct
exp(u0ℓt(ν))
. (10)
We construct the estimate νk = (θ̂k, γ̂k) by solving the following optimization:
ν̂k = arg min
‖ν‖≤W
L(ν) . (11)
In the exploitation periods of the k-th episode, the policy adheres to the estimate ν̂k = (θ̂k, γ̂k)
throughout the episode and sets the price vectors as pt = g(Xtγ̂t,Xtθ̂
k).
The policy terminates at time T but note that the policy does not need to know T in advance.
Also, by the design when the policy does not have much information about the model parameters
it updates its estimates frequently (since the length of episodes are small) but as time proceeds the
policy gathers more information about the parameters and updates its estimates less frequently,
and use them over longer episodes.
5 Regret Analysis for M3P
We next state our result on the regret of M3P policy.
Theorem 5.1. (Regret upper bound) Consider the choice model (2). Then, the worst case
T -period regret of the M3P policy is of O(log(Td)(
√
T + d log(T ))), with d and T being the feature
dimension and the length of time horizon.
Below, we state the key lemmas in the proof of Theorem 5.1 and refer to Appendices for the
proof of technical steps. Let pt = (pit)t∈Ct be the vector of prices posted at time t for products in
the consideration set Ct. Recall that M3P sets the prices as pt = g(Xtγ̂k,Xtθ̂k), where g(·, ·) is the
pricing function whose implicit characterization is given by Proposition 3.1.
Our next lemma shows that the pricing function g(·, ·) is Lipschitz. We remind that L0 is given
in Assumption 2.1, W is the initial bound on the model parameters (‖(θ0, γ0)‖ ≤ W as described
in Section 2) and N is the maximum size of the consideration set at each step.
Lemma 5.2. Suppose that p1 = g(Xtγ1,Xtθ1) and p2 = g(Xtγ2,Xtθ2). Then, there exists a
constant C = C(W,L0) > 0 such that the following holds
‖p1 − p2‖ ≤ CN2
(‖Xt(γ1 − γ2)‖2 + ‖Xt(θ1 − θ2)‖2)1/2 . (12)
We next upper bound the right-hand side of Eq (12) by bounding the estimation error of the
proposed estimator.
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Proposition 5.3. Let ν̂k be the solution of optimization problem (11). Then, there exist constants
c0, c1, and c2 (depending on W,L0, N), such that for k ≥ c0d, with probability at least 1−d−2k−1.5−
2e−c2kd, we have
‖θ̂k − θ0‖2 + ‖γ̂k − γ0‖2 ≤ c1 log(kd)
k
, (13)
The last part of the proof is to relate the regret of the policy at each period t to the distance
between the posted price vector pt and the price vector p
∗
t posted by the benchmark. Recall the
definition of revenue revπt from (4) and define the regret as regt ≡ rev∗t − revπt .
Lemma 5.4. Let p∗t = g(Xtγ0,Xtθ0) be the optimal price vector posted by the benchmark policy
that knows the model parameters θ0 and γ0 in advance. There exists a constant C > 0 (depending
on W ) such that the following holds,
regt ≤ c3N‖p∗t − pt‖2 ,
for some constant c3 = c3(W,L0).
The reason that in Lemma 5.4, the revenue gap depends on the squared of the difference of the
price vectors is that p∗t = argmin revt(p) is the optimal price and hence ∇revt(p) = 0. Therefore,
by Taylor expansion of function revt(p) around p
∗
t , we see that the first order term vanishes and
the second order term O(‖pt − p∗t ‖2) matters.
The proof of Theorem 5.1 follows by combining Lemma 5.2, Proposition 5.3 and Lemma 5.4.
We refer to Section 6.1 for its proof.
Our next theorem provides a lower bound on the T -regret of any pricing policy. The proof of
Theorem 5.5 is given in Section 6.2 and employs the notion of ‘uninformative prices’, introduced
by [6].
Theorem 5.5. (Regret lower bound) Consider the choice model (2). Then, the T -period regret
of any pricing policy in this case is Ω(
√
T ).
Theorem 5.5 implies that M3P has optimal cumulative regret in T , up to logarithmic factor.
6 Proof of Main Theorems
6.1 Proof of Theorem 5.1
By Lemma 5.4, we have
regt ≤ c3N‖pt − p∗t‖2 ≤ c3C2N4
(
‖Xt(γ̂k − γ0)‖2 + ‖Xt(θ̂k − θ0)‖2
)
, (14)
where we used Lemma 5.2. Note that the estimates γ̂k and θ̂k are constructed using the samples
in Ik and consequently are independent from the current features Xt (t is in the exploitation phase
of episode k). Taking the expectation first with respect to Xt, we obtain
E(regt) = c3C
2N5E
[
‖Σ1/2(γ̂k − γ0)‖2 + ‖Σ1/2(θ̂k − θ0)‖2
]
≤ c3cmaxC2N5E
[
‖γ̂k − γ0‖2 + ‖θ̂k − θ0‖2
]
, (15)
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where Σ = E(xix
T
i ) ∈ Rd×d is the population covariance of the features distribution and cmax is the
maximum singular value of Σ. We let G be the probability event that (13) holds true. Then, by
Proposition 5.3 we have P(G) ≥ 1− d−2k−1.5 − 2e−c2kd.
We are now in place to bound the regret of our policy. Given that the length of episodes grow
linearly, we have Regret(T ) ≤∑Kk=1 Regretk, with Regretk denoting the total expected regret during
episode k and K = ⌊√2T ⌋. Consider the two cases below:
• k ≤ c0: Here, c0 is the constant in the statement of Proposition 5.3. Since the benchmark
prices are bounded by P , given by Lemma C.1, the regret at each step is at most P and hence
the total regret over such episodes is at most P (
∑c0
i=1 k + c0d) < (c
2
0 + c0d)P .
• k > c0: In this case, we write for t ∈ Ek,
E(regt) ≤ c3cmaxC2N5
{
E
[(
‖γ̂k − γ0‖2 + ‖θ̂k − θ0‖2
)
· IG
]
+ E
[(
‖γ̂k − γ0‖2 + ‖θ̂k − θ0‖2
)
· IGc
]}
≤ c3cmaxC2N5c1 log(kd)
k
+ 4W 2P(Gc)
≤ c3cmaxC2N5c1 log(kd)
k
+ 4W 2(d−2k−1.5 + 2e−c2kd) . (16)
Hence, the total expected regret over episode k is bounded as follows
Regretk =
∑
t∈Ek
E(regt) ≤ C log(Td)(1 + d/k) , (17)
where we used the fact that |Ek| = k + d, constant C hides various constants.
To bound the cumulative expected regret up to time T , let K = ⌊√2T ⌋. By combining the two
cases, we obtain
Regret(T ) ≤ (c20 + c0d)P + C log(Td)
K∑
k=1
(1 + d/k) ≤ C˜ log(Td)(
√
T + d log(T )) .
This concludes the proof.
6.2 Proof Theorem 5.5
Since we are treating N (the maximum size of a consideration set) as constant and only interested
in the lower bound of regret in terms of time horizon T , we consider the case of N = 1. The
Ω(
√
T ) follows by existence of the so-called ‘uninformative prices’ [6]. For a fixed time t, recall
that eu
0
t /(1 + eu
0
t ) is the purchase probability, where u0t = 〈xt, θ0〉 − 〈xt, γ0〉pt and xt and pt are
respectively the product feature and the posted price at time t. An uninformative price p, is any
such price such that all the purchase probability curves (across model parameters) intersect at
that price. The name comes from the fact that such price does not reveal any information about
the underlying model parameters and hence does not help with the learning part (exploration of
the space of the model parameters). Now, if an uninformative price is also the optimal price for
a specific choice of parameters, then we would get a clear tension between the exploitation and
exploration objectives. Indeed, for a policy to learn the underlying model parameters fast enough,
it must necessarily choose prices that are away from the uninformative prices and this in turns
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leads to accruing regret when an uninformative price is in fact the optimal prices for the true
model parameters.
To construct uninformative prices, we let θ0,j = 0 and γ0,j = 0 for j > 2 and let xt,1 = 1 for all
products. We then have
u0t = 〈xt, θ0〉 − 〈xt, γ0〉pt = θ0,1 − γ0,1pt .
We set γ0,1 = θ0,1 and get u
0
t = θ0,1(1 − pt). Therefore, pt = 1, is an uninformative price, since
the purchase probability curves only depend on u0t (see Eq. (2)) and hence they all (across θ0,1)
intersect at the common price pt = 1. In addition, for θ0,1 = 2, it is easy to verify that pt = 1 is
the optimal price, using Proposition 3.1.
Now that we have established the existence of uninformative prices, it can be shown that the
worst-case T -regret of any policy is lower bounded by Ω(
√
T ).
In our next proposition, we make the above insight rigorous and formally states a lower bound
on the regret of any policy. Before proceeding with the statement, we establish a lemma. We
consider a problem class C to be a pair C = (P,Θ), with Θ = [θmin, θmax] and P = [pmin, pmax],
with θmin, pmin ≥ 0. We would like to consider models with θ0,1 = γ0,1 = θ ∈ Θ and pricing
policies that set prices in P. Note that in this case, a posted price p yields the purchase probability
eθ(1−p)/(1+e
θ(1−p)). We also assume that for the optimal price under the model parameter θ, denoted
by p∗(θ), we have p∗(θ) ∈ P for all θ ∈ Θ. Our next lemma gives a sufficient condition for this
assumption to hold.
Lemma 6.1. Suppose that pmin ≥ 1/θmax and pmax ≤ max(1, 2/θmin). Then, p∗(θ) ∈ P for all
θ ∈ Θ.
We refer to Appendix E.1 for the proof of Lemma 6.1.
Proposition 6.2. Define a problem class C = (P,Θ) by letting P = [2/5, 4/3] and Θ = [3/2, 5/2],
and the purchase probability
q(p, θ) =
eθ(1−p)
1 + eθ(1−p)
.
Then for any pricing policy π setting prices in P and any T ≥ 2, there exists a parameter θ ∈ Θ
such that
Regretπ(θ, T ) ≥
√
T
3(41)4
,
where Regretπ(θ, T ) is the total expected regret of policy π up to time T , under model parameter θ.
The proof of Proposition 6.2 follows is similar to the proof of [6, Theorem 3.1]. However, that
theorem applies only to the specific purchase probability function 1/2 + θ − θp. The proof of
Proposition 6.2 requires some detailed analysis that is deferred to Appendix E.
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A Proof of Proposition 3.1
In the benchmark policy, the seller knows the model parameters θ0, γ0. For simplicity, we use the
shorthands βi = 〈xi, γ0〉, eit = exp(〈xi, θ0〉−βipit), and the sum as G(et) =
∑
ℓ∈Ct
eℓt. The revenue
function can be written in terms of eit as
revt(pt) =
∑
i∈Ct
pitP(it = i|Ct) =
∑
i∈Ct
pit
eit
1 +G(et)
,
where we used (2). Writing the stationarity condition for the optimal price vector p∗t , we get that
for each i ∈ Ct:
∂revt(p
∗
t )
∂pit
=
eit − eitβip∗it
1 +G(et)
+
(
∑
ℓ∈Ct
p∗ℓteℓt)eitβi
(1 +G(et))2
= 0 ,
which is equivalent to
βi
eit
1 +G(et)
{
1
βi
− p∗it +
∑
ℓ∈Ct
p∗ℓteℓt
1 +G(et)︸ ︷︷ ︸
revt(pt)
}
= 0 .
Since eit > 0, the above equation implies that
p∗it =
1
βi
+ revt(p
∗
t ) . (18)
Define B0t ≡ revt(p∗t ). We next show that B0t is the solution to Equation (3). By multiplying both
sides of (18) by eℓt and summing over ℓ ∈ Ct, we have∑
ℓ∈Ct
eℓtp
∗
ℓt =
∑
ℓ∈Ct
eℓt
βℓ
+B0t
(∑
ℓ∈Ct
eℓt
)
=
∑
ℓ∈Ct
eℓt
βℓ
+B0tG(et) .
By definition of B0t , the left-hand side of the above equation is equal to B
0
t (1 + G(et)). By rear-
ranging the terms we obtain
B0t =
∑
ℓ∈Ct
eℓt
βℓ
=
∑
ℓ∈Ct
1
βℓ
e〈xℓ,θ0〉−βℓpℓt
=
∑
ℓ∈Ct
1
βℓ
exp
{
〈xℓ, θ0〉 − βℓ
( 1
βℓ
+B0t
)}
=
∑
ℓ∈Ct
1
βℓ
e〈xℓ,θ0〉e−(1+βℓB
0
t ) ,
where the second line follows from Equation (18).
Regarding the uniqueness of the solution of (3), note that the left-hand side of (3) is strictly
increasing in B and is zero at B = 0, while the right hand side is strictly decreasing in B and is
positive at B = 0. Therefore, Equation (3) has a unique solution.
B Proof of Lemma 5.2
Define function f : R×RN ×RN 7→ R as
f(B, δ, β) ≡ B −
∑
ℓ∈Ct
1
βℓ
eδℓe−(1+βℓB) . (19)
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By characterization of the pricing function g, given in Proposition 3.1, we have p
(1)
it =
1
β
(1)
i
+
B
(1)
t and p
(2)
it =
1
β
(2)
i
+ B
(2)
t , where B
(1)
t and B
(2)
t are the solution of f(B,Xtθ1,Xtγ1) = 0 and
f(B,Xtθ2,Xtγ2) = 0.
By implicit function theorem for a point (B, δ, β) that satisfies f(B, δ, β) = 0, there exists an
open set around (δ, β), and a unique differentiable function h : U 7→ R such that h(δ, β) = B and
f(h(z1, z2), z1, z2) = 0 for all (z1, z2) ∈ U . Furthermore, the partial derivative of g can be computed
as
∂h
∂δi
(δ, β) = −
[ ∂f
∂B
(δ, β)
]−1 ∂f
∂δi
(h(δ, β), δ, β)
= −
(
1 +
∑
ℓ∈Ct
eδℓe−(1+βℓB)
)−1(− 1
βi
e−(1+βiB)eδi
)
<
eδi
βi
<
eW
L0
,
where in the last step we use the normalization |δi| = |〈xi, θ1〉| ≤ W , and 0 < L0 < min βi is the
lower bound on the price sensitivities. Likewise, we have
∂h
∂βi
(δ, β) = −
[ ∂f
∂B
(δ, β)
]−1 ∂f
∂βi
(h(δ, β), δ, β)
= −
(
1 +
∑
ℓ∈Ct
eδℓe−(1+βℓB)
)−1((B
βi
+
1
βi
2
)
e−(1+βiB)eδi
)
<
( B
L0
+
1
L0
2
)
eδi < (NeW−1 + 1)
eW
L20
,
where we used the fact that the solution B of f(B, δ, β) satisfies B ≤ NeW−1/L0. (This follows
readily by noting that the right-hand side of (19) is non-increasing in B.) This shows that g(δ, β)
is a Lipschitz function of δ, with Lipschitz constant CN , where C ≡ Ne2W /min(L20, 1). Therefore,
|p(1)it − p(2)it | = |B(1)t −B(2)t |+
∣∣∣ 1
β
(1)
i
− 1
β
(2)
i
∣∣∣
= |h(Xtθ1,Xtγ1)− h(Xtθ2,Xtγ2)|+ 1
β
(1)
i β
(2)
i
|〈xi, γ1 − γ2〉|
≤ CN (‖Xt(θ1 − θ2)‖1 + ‖Xt(γ1 − γ2)‖1) + 1
L20
|〈xi, γ1 − γ2〉| . (20)
By Cauchy-Schwarz inequality we have ‖Xt(θ1 − θ2)‖1 ≤
√
N‖Xt(θ1 − θ2)‖ and ‖Xt(γ1 − γ2)‖1 ≤√
N‖Xt(γ1 − γ2)‖. Hence, ‖p(1)t − p(2)t ‖ ≤ C˜N2 (‖Xt(θ1 − θ2)‖+ ‖Xt(γ1 − γ2)‖), for some constant
C˜. The claim now follows by using a+ b <
√
2(a2 + b2).
C Proof of Proposition 5.3
We start by recalling the notation ν0 = (θ
T
0 , γ
T
0 )
T and define X˜t = [Xt, −diag(pt)Xt]. To prove
Proposition 5.3, we first rewrite the loss function in terms of the augmented parameter vector ν.
(Recall our convention that ∅ corresponds to “no-purchase” with u0∅t(·) = 0 .)
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Lk(ν) = − 1
kd
∑
t∈Ik
log
exp(u0itt)∑
ℓ∈Ct∪{∅}
exp(u0ℓt)
=
1
kd
∑
t∈Ik
(log(1 +
∑
ℓ∈Ct
e〈xℓ,θ〉−pℓt〈xℓ,γ〉)−
({
0 it = ∅
〈xit , θ〉 − pit〈xit , γ〉 otherwise
)
=
1
kd
∑
t∈Ik
log(1 +∑
ℓ∈Ct
e〈x˜ℓ,ν〉)−
({
0 it = ∅
〈x˜it , ν〉 otherwise
) ,
(21)
where x˜ℓ = [x
T
ℓ ,−pℓtxTℓ ]T . The gradient and the hessian of Lk are given by
∇Lk(ν) = 1
kd
∑
t∈Ik
(∑
ℓ∈Ct
exp(u0ℓ )u
0
ℓ x˜ℓ
1 +
∑
ℓ∈Ct
exp(u0ℓ )
− x˜it
)
, (22)
∇2Lk(ν) = 1
kd
∑
t∈Ik
(1 +
∑
ℓ∈Ct
exp(u0ℓ ))(
∑
ℓ∈Ct
exp(u0ℓ )((u
0
ℓ )
2 + 1)x˜⊗2ℓ )− (
∑
ℓ∈Ct
u0ℓ x˜ℓ)
⊗2
(1 +
∑
ℓ∈Ct
exp(u0ℓ ))
2
. (23)
We proceed by bounding the gradient and the hessian of the loss function. Before that, we
establish an upper bound on the prices that are set by the pricing function g.
Lemma C.1. Suppose that ‖xℓ‖∞ ≤ 1 and ‖ν0‖1 ≤W . Let Bu = Bu(W,L0, N) be the solution to
the following equation:
B = N
1
L0
e−(1+L0B)eW . (24)
Then, the prices set by the pricing function pt = g(Xtγ,Xθ), where ν0 = (θ
T
0 , γ
T
0 )
T , are bounded by
P = 1/L0 +B
u.
The proof of above Lemma follows readily by noting that the right-hand side of (24) is an upper
bound for the right hand side of (3) and therefore B0t ≤ Bu. The results then follows by recalling
that the pricing function sets prices as pit = 1/βi +B
0
t .
To bound the gradient of the loss function at the true model parameters, note that
∇Lk(ν0) = 1
kd
∑
t∈Ik
St , with St ≡
∑
ℓ∈Ct
exp(u0ℓt)u
0
ℓtx˜ℓ
1 +
∑
ℓ∈Ct
exp(u0ℓt)
− x˜it (25)
We also have
|u0ℓt| ≤ |〈xℓ, θ0〉+ |〈xℓ, γ0〉|pℓt ≤W (1 + P ) ≡M , (26)
for a constant M = M(W,L0, N) > 0 and so ‖St‖ ≤ (M + 1)
√
d(1 + P 2), because ‖x˜ℓ‖ ≤√
d(1 + P 2). Note that by (25), ∇Lk(ν0) is written as some of kd terms. In each term, the index
it has randomness coming from the market noise distribution. By a straightforward calculation,
one can verify that each of these terms has zero expectation. Using (26) and by applying Matrix
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Freedman inequality to the right-hand side of (25), followed by union bounding over d coordinates
of feature vectors, we obtain
‖∇Lk(ν0)‖ ≤ λk, with λk ≡ 2(M + 1)
√
d(1 + P 2)
log(d|Ik|)
|Ik| , (27)
with probability at least 1− d−0.5|Ik|−1.5.
We next pass to lower bonding the hessian of the loss. For any ν˜ with ‖ν˜‖ ≤W , we have
〈ν0 − ν̂k,∇2Lk(ν˜)(ν0 − ν̂k)〉
=
1
kd
∑
t∈Ik
(1 +
∑
ℓ∈Ct
exp(u˜0ℓt))(
∑
ℓ∈Ct
exp(u˜0ℓt)((u˜
0
ℓt)
2 + 1)(x˜ℓ(ν0 − ν̂k))2 − (
∑
ℓ∈Ct
u˜0ℓtx˜ℓ(ν0 − ν̂k))2
(1 +
∑
ℓ∈Ct
exp(u˜0ℓt))
2
(a)
≥ 1
kd
∑
t∈Ik
∑
ℓ∈Ct
exp(u˜0ℓt)((u˜
0
ℓt)
2 + 1)(x˜ℓ(ν0 − ν̂k))2 +
∑
ℓ∈Ct
exp(u˜0ℓt)
∑
ℓ∈Ct
exp(u˜0ℓt)(x˜ℓ(ν0 − ν̂k))2
(1 +
∑
ℓ∈Ct
exp(u˜0ℓt))
2
(b)
>
1
kd
∑
t∈Ik
(∑
ℓ∈Ct
exp(u˜0ℓt)(x˜ℓ(ν0 − ν̂k))2
1 +
∑
ℓ∈Ct
exp(u˜0ℓt)
)
(c)
≥ e
−M
kd
∑
t∈Ik
∑
ℓ∈Ct
(x˜ℓ(ν0 − ν̂k))2
1 +NeM
(d)
≥ e
−M
kd(1 +NeM )
‖X˜(k−1)(γ0 − γ̂k)‖2
≡ c0(W,L0, N)
Nkd
‖X˜(k−1)(ν0 − ν̂k)‖2 , (28)
where (a) and (b) follow from Jensen’s Inequality. (c) is because |u˜0ℓ | ≤ M by definition (26) and
the assumption ‖ν˜‖ ≤W ; in (d), we define nk ≡
∑
t∈Ik
|Ct| ≤ Nkd and construct X˜(k−1) of size nk
by 2d, by staking the features x˜t, for t ∈ Ik, row-wise.
By optimality of ν̂k and the second order Taylor expansion we have
0 ≥ L(ν0)− L(ν̂k) = −〈∇L(ν0), ν̂k − ν0〉 − 1
2
〈ν̂k − ν0,∇2L(ν˜)(ν̂k − ν0))〉 , (29)
for some ν˜ on the segment between ν0 and ν̂
k.
Therefore by (29) and (28) we arrive at
c0(W,L0, N)
2Nkd
‖X˜(k−1)(ν0 − ν̂k)‖2 ≤ ‖∇L(ν0)‖‖ν̂k − ν0‖.
Using the bounds on the gradient given by (27), we get that with probability at least 1−d−0.5|Ik|−1.5
c0(W,L0, N)
2Nkd
‖X˜(k−1)(ν0 − ν̂k)‖2 ≤ λk‖ν̂k − ν0‖ . (30)
Next, in order to lower bound the left-hand side of (30), we first lower bound the minimum eigen-
value of Σ̂k, the empirical second moment of X˜
(k−1)
, defined as
Σ̂k ≡ 1
nk
X˜
(k−1)
(X˜
(k−1)
)T =
1
nk
∑
t∈Ik,ℓ∈Ct
x˜ℓx˜
T
ℓ ,
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where we recall that x˜ℓ = [x
T
ℓ ,−pℓtxTℓ ]T for ℓ ∈ Ct.
Since rows of X˜
(k−1)
are bounded, they are subgaussian. Using [32, Remark 5.40], there exist
universal constants c and C such that for every m ≥ 0, the following holds with probability at least
1− 2e−cm2 :
∥∥∥Σ̂k − Σ˜∥∥∥
op
≤ max(δ, δ2) where δ = C
√
d
nk
+
m√
nk
, (31)
where Σ˜ = E[x˜ℓx˜
T
ℓ ] ∈ R2d×2d is the covariance of the these vectors. We proceed by computing
Σ˜ ≡ E[x˜ℓx˜Tℓ ]. Recall that for period t ∈ Ik, the prices are set uniformly at random from [0, B].
Hence, letting µ = E[xℓ] and Σ ≡ E[xℓxTℓ ] the population first and second moments of xℓ, we have
Σ˜ ≡ E[x˜ℓx˜Tℓ ] =
(
Σ −Bµ2
−BµT2 B
2
3
)
. (32)
The Schur complement of Σ˜, with respect to block Σ, reads as
B2
3
− B
2
4
µTΣ−1µ ≥ B
2
3
− B
2
4
=
B2
12
,
where we used the fact that µTΣ−1µ ≤ 1 which follows readily by looking at the Schur complement
of the second moment of a = [xt; 1], i.e., E[aa
T ] = [Σ µ;µT 1] and use the fact that the Schur
complement of positive semidefinite matrices is nonnegative. As a result of (32), the singular values
of Σ˜ are larger than c˜min ≡ min(cmin, B2/12).
Then, for nk > c0d, with probability at least 1− 2e−c2nk , the following is true:∥∥∥Σ̂k − Σ˜∥∥∥
op
≤ 1
2
c˜min , (33)
and hence the minimum singular value of Σ̂k is at least c˜min/2. Using this in Equation (30) we get
that with probability at least 1− d−0.5|Ik|−1.5 − 2e−c2nk ,
1
2
c˜min‖ν̂k − ν0‖2 ≤ 1
nk
‖X˜(k−1)(ν̂k − ν0)‖2 . (34)
Combining (35) and (30) leads to
nkc0(W,L0, N)
4Nkd
c˜min‖ν̂k − ν0‖2 ≤ c0(W,L0, N)
2Nkd
‖X˜(k−1)(ν̂k − ν0)‖2 ≤ λk‖ν0 − ν̂k‖ , (35)
which gives that with probability at least 1− d−2k−1.5 − 2e−c2kd, the following holds true
‖ν̂k − ν0‖ ≤ 4Nkd
nkc0c˜min
λk ≤ 4N
c0c˜min
λk .
The proof is complete.
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D Proof of Lemma 5.4
In this lemma, we aim at bounding the revenue loss (against the clairvoyant policy) in terms of the
distance between the posted price vector and the optimal one posted by the clairvoyant policy. By
Taylor expansion,
revt(pt) = revt(p
∗
t ) +∇revt(p∗t )(pt − p∗t ) +
1
2
(pt − p∗t )T∇2revt(p˜)(pt − p∗t ) , (36)
for some p˜ between pt and p
∗
t . Note that p
∗
t = argmax revt(p), thus ∇revt(p∗t ) = 0 and the first
term in the Taylor expansion vanishes.
In order to prove the result, it suffices to show that the operator norm ‖∇2revt(p˜)‖2 is bounded.
Fix i, j ∈ Ct. We have
∂revt(p)
∂pi
=
eu
0
it(1− βipi)
1 +
∑
ℓ∈Ct
eu
0
ℓt
+
∑
k∈Ct
pke
u0
kt
(1 +
∑
ℓ∈Ct
eu
0
ℓt)2
, (37)
with βi = 〈xi, γ0〉. Taking derivative with respect to pj, we get
∂2revt(p)
∂pi∂pj
=
eu
0
jt
(1 +
∑
ℓ∈Ct
eu
0
ℓt)2
[
βj(1− βipi)eu0it + 1− pjβj
]
+ 2βje
u0jt
∑
k∈Ct
pke
u0
kt
(1 +
∑
ℓ∈Ct
eu
0
ℓt)3
. (38)
By Lemma C.1, we have pit ≤ P . Also, by (26), we have |u0ℓt| ≤ M . In addition, 0 ≤ βi ≤
‖xi‖∞‖γ0‖1 ≤ W . Since P and M are constants depending only on W and L0, there exists a
constant c1(W,L0) > 0, such that ∣∣∣ ∂2revt
∂pi∂pj
∣∣∣ ≤ c1(W,L0) , (39)
uniformly over i, j ∈ Ct. We next bound the operator norm of ∇2revt(p). Note that for a matrix
A ∈ RN×N , we have
‖A‖2 = sup
‖u‖≤1
|uTAu| ≤ sup
‖u‖≤1
{ N∑
i,j=1
|Ai,j | |ui| |uj |
}
≤ |A|∞ sup
‖u‖≤1
‖u‖21 ≤ N |A|∞ , (40)
where |A|∞ = max1≤i,j≤N |Aij |. Therefore, the result follows by using (39).
E Proof of Proposition 6.2
Define the purchase probability q(θ, p) and the revenue function r(θ, p) as
q(p; θ) =
eθ(1−p)
1 + eθ(1−p)
, r(p; θ) = p
eθ(1−p)
1 + eθ(1−p)
. (41)
We next find the optimal price corresponding to parameter θ. Write
r′(p; θ) = 1− (1 + θp) 1
1 + eθ(1−p)
+
θp
(1 + eθ(1−p))2
, (42)
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which implies that the optimal price p∗(θ) satisfies the following relation
θp∗(θ) = 1 + eθ(1−p
∗(θ)) . (43)
Our next lemma is on some properties of the problem class C considered in the statement of
Proposition 6.2. Its proof is given in Appendix E.2.
Lemma E.1. For all p ∈ P = [2/5, 4/3] and θ ∈ Θ = [3/2, 5/2],
(i) For θ0 = 2, we have |q(p, θ)− q(p, θ0)| ≤ |p∗(θ)− p| |θ − θ0|.
(ii) r(p∗(θ))− r(p) ≥ 1520 (p∗(θ)− p)2.
(iii) |p∗(θ)− p∗(θ0)| ≥ 0.2|θ − θ0|.
In order to establish a lower bound on the regret of a policy, we need to quantitatively measure
the uncertainty of the policy about the unknown model parameter θ. To this end, we leverage the
notion of the KL divergence of two probability measures f0 and f1 defined on a discrete sample
space Ω as
KL(f0; f1) ≡
∑
ω∈Ω
f0(ω) log
(
f0(ω)
f1(ω)
)
. (44)
For any pricing policy π and parameter θ ∈ Θ we let fπ,θt : {0, 1}t → [0, 1] be the probability
distribution of the customer purchase responses Yt = (Y1, . . . , Yt) under pricing policy π and
model parameter θ. Formally, for all yt = (y1, . . . , yt) ∈ {0, 1}t,
fπ,θt (yt) =
t∏
i=1
q(pi, θ)
yi(1− q(pi, θ))1−yi ,
where pi = π(yi−1) is the price posted under policy π.
The next lemma shows that in order to reduce the uncertainty about model parameter θ0
(equivalently increasing KL(fπ,θ0t ; f
π,θ
t )), the policy incurs a large regret. We refer to Appendix E.3
for its proof.
Lemma E.2. For any θ ∈ Θ, t ≥ 1, θ0 = 2 and any policy π setting prices in P, we have
KL(fπ,θ0t ; f
π,θ
t ) ≤ 3640(θ0 − θ)2Regretπ(t, θ0) ,
where Regretπ(t, θ0) indicates the total expected regret of the pricing policy π, up until step t, under
model parameter θ0.
The next lemma is similar to [6, Lemma 3.4] and its proof follows along the same lines for our
purchase probability function (in particular, using Lemma E.1 (ii, iii)).
Lemma E.3. Let π be any pricing policy setting prices in P. Then, for any T ≥ 2 and model
parameters θ0 = 2 and θ1 = θ0 +
1
4T
−1/4, we have
Regretπ(T, θ0) + Regret
π(T, θ1) ≥
√
T
2080(41)2
e−KL(f
π,θ0
T
;f
π,θ1
T
) .
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Armed with Lemma E.2 and E.3 we are ready to prove Theorem 5.5. Let θ0 = 2 and θ1 =
θ0 +
1
4T
−1/4. Then, by non-negativity of KL-divergence and by virtue of Lemma E.2 we have
Regretπ(T, θ0) + Regret
π(T, θ1) ≥ 16
3640
√
T KL(fπ,θ0t ; f
π,θ
t ) .
Combining this bound with Lemma E.3 we get
2 {Regretπ(T, θ0) + Regretπ(T, θ1)} ≥ 16
3640
√
T KL(fπ,θ0t ; f
π,θ
t ) +
√
T
2080(41)2
e−KL(f
π,θ0
T
;f
π,θ1
T
)
≥
√
T
2080(41)2
{
KL(fπ,θ0t ; f
π,θ
t ) + e
−KL(f
π,θ0
t ;f
π,θ
t )
}
≥
√
T
2080(41)2
,
where we used that a+ e−a ≥ 1 for all a ≥ 0. Hence,
max
θ∈{θ0,θ1}
Regretπ(T, θ) ≥
√
T
2× 2080(41)2 >
√
T
3(41)4
,
which completes the proof.
E.1 Proof of Lemma 6.1
By (43) we have θp∗(θ) ≥ 1. Hence, for θ ∈ Θ we have p∗(θ) ≥ 1/θmax. To prove the other side,
assume that p∗(θ) > 1 for some θ ∈ Θ. Then, by (43), we have
θp∗(θ) = 1 + eθ(1−p
∗(θ)) < 2 ,
which gives p∗(θ) < 2/θ ≤ 2/θmin. As a result, p∗(θ) ≤ max(1, 2/θmin) completing the proof of the
lemma.
E.2 Proof of Lemma E.1
To prove the first item, write
|q(p, θ)− q(p, θ0)| =
∣∣∣ 1
1 + eθ(1−p)
− 1
1 + eθ0(1−p)
∣∣∣
≤ |e
θ(1−p) − eθ0(1−p)|
(1 + eθ(1−p))(1 + eθ0(1−p))
≤ e
max(θ,θ0)|1−p|(1− e−|θ0−θ||1−p|)
(1 + eθ(1−p))(1 + eθ0(1−p))
≤ 1− e−|θ0−θ||1−p| ≤ |θ0 − θ| |1− p|
= |θ0 − θ| |p∗(θ0)− p| ,
where the last inequality follows since 1 − e−x ≤ x for x ≥ 0. Further, the last inequality holds
since p∗(θ0) = 1 for θ0 = 2 by using (43).
To prove the second item, by some algebraic calculation,
r′′(p) = θeθ(1−p)
(
θp(1− eθ(1−p))− 2(1 + eθ(1−p))
)
(1 + eθ(1−p))−3 . (45)
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Since θ ∈ Θ and p ∈ P, if p ≤ 1 then θp(1− eθ(1−p))− 2(1 + eθ(1−p)) ≤ −4; otherwise
θp(1− eθ(1−p))− 2(1 + eθ(1−p)) ≤ 10
3
(1− eθ(1−p))− 2(1 + eθ(1−p))
≤ 4
3
− 16
3
eθ(1−p) ≤ 4
3
− 16
3
e−5/6 < −0.98 .
Combining these two cases and using the characterization (45), we arrive at
r′′(p) ≤ −0.98θeθ(1−p)(1 + eθ(1−p))−3 ≤ −0.98× 3/2 × e−5/6 × (1 + e3/2)−3 < −1/260 , (46)
where we used that eθ(1−p) ∈ [e−5/6, e3/2] for θ ∈ Θ and p ∈ P.
Now by Taylor expansion of r(p) around p∗ we obtain
r(p) = r(p∗(θ)) + r′(p∗(θ))(p− p∗(θ)) + 1
2
r′′(p˜)(p − p∗(θ))2 ,
for some p˜ between p and p∗(θ). Note that by optimality of p∗(θ), we have r′(p∗(θ)) = 0. Further,
(46) implies that
r(p) ≤ r(p∗(θ))− 1
520
(p− p∗(θ))2 .
Finally to prove item (iii), taking derivative of both sides of (43) with respect to θ gives us
p∗(θ) + θ
d
dθ
p∗(θ) =
(
1− p∗(θ)− θ d
dθ
p∗(θ)
)
eθ(1−p
∗(θ)) ,
and therefore by rearranging the terms
d
dθ
p∗(θ) = −1
θ
(
p∗(θ) +
eθ(1−p
∗(θ))
1 + eθ(1−p∗(θ))
)
.
Since eθ(1−p) ≥ e−5/6, for θ ∈ Θ and p ∈ P, we get
∣∣∣ d
dθ
p∗(θ)
∣∣∣ ≥ 2
5
(
2
5
+
e−5/6
1 + e−5/6
)
≥ 0.2
The result then follows by an application of the Mean Value Theorem.
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E.3 Proof of Lemma E.2
By employing the chain rule for KL divergence [11, Theorem 2.5.3],
KL(fπ,θ0t ; f
π,θ
t ) =
t∑
s=1
KL(fπ,θ0t ; f
π,θ
t |Ys−1)
=
t∑
s=1
∑
ys∈{0,1}s
fπ,θ0s (ys) log
(
fπ,θ0s (ys|ys−1)
fπ,θs (ys|ys−1)
)
=
t∑
s=1
∑
ys−1∈{0,1}s−1
fπ,θ0s−1 (ys−1)
∑
ys∈{0,1}
fπ,θ0s (ys|ys−1) log
(
fπ,θ0s (ys|ys−1)
fπ,θs (ys|ys−1)
)
=
t∑
s=1
∑
ys−1∈{0,1}s−1
fπ,θ0s−1 (ys−1)KL(f
π,θ0
s (ys|ys−1); fπ,θs (ys|ys−1))
≤
t∑
s=1
1
q(ps, θ)(1− q(ps, θ))
∑
ys−1∈{0,1}s−1
fπ,θ0s−1 (ys−1)(q(ps; θ0)− q(ps; θ))2
≤ 7
t∑
s=1
∑
ys−1∈{0,1}s−1
fπ,θ0s−1 (ys−1)(q(ps; θ0)− q(ps; θ))2 ,
where in the penultimate step we used the inequality KL(B1;B2) ≤ (q1−q2)
2
q2(1−q2)
for two Bernoulli
random variables B1 and B2 with parameters q1 and q2, respectively [31, Corollary 3.1]. In the last
step we used that q(ps, θ) for ps ∈ P and θ ∈ Θ. Next, by using Lemma E.1 (item 1) we obtain
KL(fπ,θ0t ; f
π,θ
t ) ≤ 7(θ0 − θ)2
t∑
s=1
∑
ys−1∈{0,1}s−1
fπ,θ0s−1 (ys−1)(p
∗(θ0)− ps)2
= 7(θ0 − θ)2
t∑
s=1
Eθ0(p
∗(θ0)− ps)2 ,
where we used the observation that ps is a measurable function of ys−1 and Eθ0 denotes expectation
with respect to fπ,θ0s−1 measure. Next by using Lemma E.1 (item 2), we get
KL(fπ,θ0t ; f
π,θ
t ) ≤ 3640(θ0 − θ)2
t∑
s=1
Eθ0(r(p
∗(θ0))− r(ps)) ≤ 3640(θ0 − θ)2Regretπ(t, θ0) .
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